Due to a lack of survivors and physical evidence, the cause of the crash remains some speculation, reports say. However, it was concluded that the yacht capsized after the keel fell off. The investigation focused on the keel that had come loose from the capsized yacht. As you can see in the photos, the quad’s rear keel bolts are rusted and possibly broken. The report specifically mentioned emails between crew members about the sinking of the yacht, as well as messages from the yacht’s owners, some of which were not received. The design and specifications of the keel referenced the Wolfson Unit of the University of Southampton, which compared the specifications to the current required design standards. They found that the keel and specifications were mostly up to current standards, except that the diameter and thickness of the keel washers were narrower by 3mm. They believed that with broken (rusted) keel bolts, the keel would not stay connected in a 90 degree collapse. The following key safety issues have been identified: • If bonding is used to attach the stiffener to the hull, the bonding may break, weakening the entire structure. It is important to note that a broken link can be difficult to detect. • “Light” grounding can still cause significant undetected damage to the matrix link. • Regular inspections of the hull and internal structure should help provide early warning of possible keel separation. • Planning for sea access and careful route planning can greatly reduce the risk of weather-related damage. • If water intrusion is detected, all possible sources of ingress should be checked, including where the keel meets the hull. • In the event of capsizing and capsizing, it is necessary to be able to sound an alarm and leave the liferaft. Below is a summary of the report. Click here to read the full text Around 04:00 on May 16, 2014, the UK-registered yacht Cheeki Rafiki was heading out of Antigua about 720 meters east-southeast of Nova Scotia. , Canada Miles rolled over in Southampton, England. Despite extensive searches and the discovery of the overturned hull of the yacht, the four crew members have yet to be found. At approximately 04:05 on May 16, the captain of the personal radio beacon, Chiki Rafiki, sounded the alarm, prompting a massive search for the yacht by US Coast Guard aircraft and surface ships. At 14:00 on May 17, the overturned hull of a small boat was discovered, but bad weather conditions prevented a closer inspection, and at 09:40 on May 18, the search was abandoned. At 11:35 am on May 20, at the official request of the British government, a second search began. On 23 May at 1535 hours the overturned hull of the yacht was found and identified as that of Chika Rafiki. During the investigation, it was confirmed that the ship’s life rafts were still on board in their normal stowed position. The second search ended at 02:00 on 24 May as no one was found. The hull of Cheeki Rafiki was not recovered and is estimated to have sunk.
In the absence of survivors and physical evidence, the cause of the crash remains some speculation. However, it was concluded that Chiki Rafiki capsized and capsized after the keel broke off. Other than any obvious damage to the hull or rudder directly attributable to the separation of the keel, it is unlikely that the vessel collided with an underwater object. Rather, the combined impact of the prior grounding and subsequent repairs to her keel and base may have weakened the ship’s structure, with her keel attached to her hull. It is also possible that one or more of the keel bolts were damaged. The subsequent loss of strength can lead to keel displacement, which is exacerbated by increased side loads when sailing in deteriorating sea conditions. The yacht’s operator, Stormforce Coaching Ltd, has made changes to its internal policies and implemented a number of measures to prevent a recurrence of the incident. The Maritime and Coast Guard Agency has undertaken to clearly codify the requirements for stowage of inflatable liferafts on board ships in collaboration with the Royal Yachting Institute, which has developed an expanded version of its survival guide at sea that addresses the possibility of keel breakage. The British Maritime Federation has been asked to work with certifiers, manufacturers and repairers to develop industry-leading guidelines for the inspection and repair of yachts with fiberglass backings and bonded hulls. Maritime and Coast Guard agencies have also been asked to provide clearer guidance on when commercial small craft certification is required and when it is not. Further advice was given to the governing body of the sport to issue operational guidelines for the commercial and recreational sectors of the yachting world in order to raise awareness of the potential damage from any grounding and the factors to be considered when planning nautical paragraphs.
Post time: Feb-22-2023